

Strategy for the Long War
2006 -- 2016

27 September 2006

This Briefing is Classified

SECRET – PREDECISIONAL – CLOSE HOLD

Derived from: Multiple Sources

Declassify on: 27 SEP 2016

Briefing Purpose



- **Confirm task analysis**
- **Obtain guidance**

Task / Purpose



TASK: Recommend an integrated national “Long War” strategy for the next five to ten years to advance toward the desired global and regional end states

PURPOSE: Support the development of “Best Military Advice” by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Develop and present a balanced ENDS / WAYS / MEANS strategic equation

Specified Tasks



- **Determine where we are now and where we are going**
 - What are we trying to do? – *identify current strategy and its end states*
 - Are we going to get there this way? – *assess trends*
 - What's keeping us from success? – *identify impediments*

- ENDS {
- **Determine desired future regional and global end states**
 - Express in multi-dimensional terms (D – I – M – E)
 - Focus on period five to ten years in the future
 - Compare to currently articulated end states

- WAYS {
- **Recommend strategy to achieve desired end states**
 - Express in multi-dimensional terms (D – I – M – E) for US
 - Identify potential key coalition/international contributions
 - Identify obstacles to executing recommended strategy
 - DoD / Interagency / Others

- MEANS {
- **Consider adequacy of means to support recommended strategy**
 - Identify requirements to execute strategy
 - DoD / Interagency / Others



Assumptions – Next Ten Years

- **Broad national strategic objectives of the NSS remain generally consistent**
- ***“Long War” – The sustained multi-lateral effort to defeat violent Islamic extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society and create a global environment inhospitable to violent Islamic extremists and all who support them***
- **Execution of the Long War remains the strategic focus, but we must be ready to meet other national security requirements.**

For Discussion...



- Is 2006 – 2016 the right time frame to consider?
- What degree of freedom do we have to deviate from national strategic guidance?

- **FOR EXAMPLE...**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

- Iran armed with nuclear weapons acceptable?
 - Open dialogue with adversaries – Iran, HAMAS, Syria... ?
 - Others?
- Are there “Redlines” that we cannot cross?
- **FOR EXAMPLE...**
- Increase to force structure?
 - Increase forward deployed posture?
 - Others?



- Work “CENTCOM AOR” first
 - *Include Israeli-Palestinian conflict and other key cross-boundary issues*
- Consider all forms of national power
- Strategy should be unconstrained but feasible
- Think creatively
- Consult specified SMEs and identify other desired sources
- Consider US regional and global perspectives
- Consider non-US regional and global perspectives
- Process and product are **SECRET**; higher classification as necessary
- Expand research to include non-military sources



Research Sources

• **Key sources**

- National Intelligence Estimate for trends in Global Terrorism
- Regional GWOT and Strategic assessments
- 7500-Series Plans
- Current USCENTCOM “Long War” Briefing
- National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terror (NMSP-WOT)
- National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
- National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror

• **SMEs**

- BG Caslen, BG Schloesser, COL(Ret) Harvey, Mr. Strmecki
- Former Speaker Gingrich; Gen (Ret) Zinni; Ms. Karen Hughes
- Fouad Ajami (Johns Hopkins); Vali Nasr (NPS); LTG Dayton
- *Other military and civilian academic sources*



Proposed Presentation Schedule

- **CENTCOM AOR**

- **Where we are now and where we are going** 06 OCT
- **Desired regional end state** 13 OCT
- **IPR** 20 OCT
- **Recommended strategy** 27 OCT
- **Assess means to support strategy** 03 NOV

-
- **Next Step = Global Strategic Template** 10 NOV
 - **Final Joint Chiefs of Staff Briefing** 17 NOV

Staff Team Members



• USA

- COL (b)(6)
- COL
- COL

[Redacted]

• USMC

- Col (b)(6)
- Col
- Col
- Mr.

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Strategy for the Long War
2006 – 2016:
“Where we are”

6 October 2006

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Agenda



- **Task/Purpose Review**
- **SITREP**
- **“Where we are”**
 - **The Long War**
 - **Complex Threat Array**
 - **US Strategic Culture**
 - **Strategic Guidance and Plans**
 - **CENTCOM AOR**
- **Key First Impressions**
- **Way Ahead**

Task / Purpose



TASK: Provide strategic options that support the development of a comprehensive and integrated national strategy for the next ten years of the “Long War.”

PURPOSE: Support the development of “Best Military Advice” by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Develop and present a balanced ENDS / WAYS / MEANS strategic equation



The “Long War”

- **The Long War is the sustained effort to defeat violent extremism as a threat to our way of life and to create a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and those states and non-state entities that support them.**
- **Execution of the Long War remains the strategic focus, but we must be ready to meet other national security requirements.**



• **Reviewed Key sources**

- ✓ National Intelligence Estimate for Trends in Global Terrorism
- ✓ Regional GWOT and Strategic assessments
- ✓ 7500-Series Plans
- ✓ Current USCENTCOM "Long War" Briefing
- ✓ National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terror (NMSP-WOT)
- ✓ National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
- ✓ National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror
- ✓ Contingency Planning Guidance

• **SMEs**

- ✓ Gen (Ret) Zinni
- ✓ Mr. Derek Harvey (J2/DIA)
- ✓ Joint Staff J2/DIA, J3, J5

The Long War



- **Complex interactive layered conflicts with global impact**
 - **No single causal factor or holistic solution**
 - **Danger of oversimplification – attacking symptoms may exacerbate causes**
 - **Constant hybrid / asymmetrical conflict punctuated by “small wars”**
- **“Long War” means long... a generational conflict**
 - **Implies long commitments as well**
 - **Sustained application of all elements of national power**
- **Spillover from intra-Islamic conflict, not “clash of civilizations”**
 - **Islamic communities seeking to define their future in a modern world**
 - **Radical message resonates in disaffected populations**
 - **Shi’a resurgence causing extreme anxiety in Sunni Arab world**
- **No one single historical analogy provides adequate insights**
 - **Applying a single case may lead to appealing but inappropriate choices**
 - **Cold War not a perfect fit as a historical analogy**

Complex Threat Array



OTHER CONCERNS

IRAN
NORTH KOREA
CHINA
OEF-P
OEF-TS
SYRIA
VENEZUELA

• IMMEDIATE THREATS

- Spectrum of terrorists
 - *Globally networked pros to local independents*
- Insurgents / AQ (I-N-AM) / Taliban
- Sustained efforts to acquire WMD

• FACTORS AND CHARACTERISTICS

- Radicalization
 - *Israeli – Palestinian Conflict*
 - *Magnet of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan*
 - *“Angry Young Men” – pervasive sense of exclusion and oppression*
 - *Effective global marketing of radical Islamic ideological*
- Host environments in ill-governed, failing, failed, or fragile countries
- State sponsors, unwitting hosts, “sanctuary,” and proxies
- Hybrid / asymmetrical approach to warfare

US Strategic Culture



• SEEING OURSELVES

- Typical worldview is through Judeo – Christian Prism
- Actions and opinions shaped by belief in the Rule of Law
 - *Ingrained respect for individual and minority rights*
- DIME-FIL potential diminished by inefficient use of non-Military power
- Acceptance of global humanitarian and moral obligations
 - *Super power implies super responsibilities*
 - *“Can Do” attitude*
- International Affairs heavily influenced by domestic politics
 - *Tension between policy / resources and end-state*

• HOW OTHERS SEE US

- Culturally naïve... idealistic vs. realistic
- Arrogant, inconsistent, and blundering -- *fickle approach to allies*
- Historically shallow
- Impatient... interest fades with lack of results
- Inflexible ... “Do it Our Way”
- Adverse to hardships



National Military Strategic Plan for the WOT

Ends

Strategic Goal: *Preserve and promote the way of life of free and open societies based on the rule of law, defeat terrorist extremism as a threat to our way of life, and create a global environment inhospitable to terrorist extremists.*

Leadership	Safe Havens	Enemy	Finance	Communication
Movement	Intelligence	Weapons	Personnel	Ideology

Protect the Homeland

Disrupt and Attack Terrorist Networks

Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism

Ways

Military Strategic Objectives

Deny terrorists the resources they need to operate and survive.

Enable partner nations to counter terrorism.

Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials, and maintain capacity for consequence management.

Defeat terrorists and their organizations.

Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations.

Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism.

Means

Combatant Commands, Services, and Combat Support Agencies


SOCOM CONPLAN 7500



- **Strategic Aims:**
 - Isolate the threat to regional and local levels
 - Defeat isolated terrorist threats
 - Prevent the re-constitution of threats already defeated
 - Prevent the emergence of new terrorist threats
- **Campaign Objectives:**
 - Defeat the al-Qaida Network (AQN)
 - Defeat of the Al-Qaida Network is the most immediate objective and main effort
 - The detailed plan for Al-Qaida Network defeat is in USSOCOM CONPLAN 7501
 - Neutralize or contain other violent extremist organizations
 - Initial considerations toward Iranian and Syrian support to violent extremists.
- **Critical Tasks:**
 - Disrupt Violent Extremist Organizations
 - Deny Access / WMD by Violent Extremist Organizations
 - Enable Partners to Combat Violent Extremist Organizations
 - Deter/Dissuade Tacit and Active Support for Violent Extremist Organizations
 - Erode Support for Violent Extremist Ideology

CONPLAN 7500 is GWOT's military foundation

CENTCOM's Long War Today





CENTCOM AOR – Regional Trends

- **Ascendant Shi'ism and growing Sunni – Shi'a rift**

- **Numerous fragile, failed, or failing states**
 - ***Growing dissatisfaction with chronic socio-economic inequalities***
 - ***Domestic acceptance of authoritarian exclusionary rule declining***
 - ***Several states beginning limited social and political reform***
 - ***Radical message gaining popularity in some outwardly moderate states***
 - ***Petroleum dominant source of wealth -- other economic sectors declining***

- **Ethnic identities challenge stability and arbitrary “national” boundaries**

- **Some regional leaders frustrated with US foreign policy and actions**



CENTCOM AOR – Regional Drivers

- **Iraq and Afghanistan are primary battlefields with AQ / AQAM**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

- ***Taliban resurgence supported by AQ threatens progress in Afghanistan***
- ***NATO resolve and capabilities being tested***
- **Pakistan**
 - ***Musharraf vulnerable to domestic pressures and resistance***
 - ***Pakistani succession unclear... stable policy unlikely***
 - ***FATA disputes erode fragile Afghan-Pakistan relations***
 - ***Pakistani focus on Kashmir and India***
- **Iran assertive, confrontational, exporting instability regionally / globally**
 - ***High potential for mutual miscalculation***
 - ***Hizbollah conflict reinforces use of proxies for strategic effect***
- **Stalled “Road Map” and US-ISR special relationship fuel anti-US sentiments**
 - ***Resolving Israeli-Palestinian issue cornerstone of regional stability***

Key First Impressions



- May not fully understand the nature of the Long War threat at the macro/global or micro/campaign level
 - *Is the true Center of Gravity “ideology” or “Angry Young Men?”*
- Strategic equation is unbalanced... “Strategy/Resource Mismatch”
 - *Inadequate resources (means) dedicated to achieve defined ends*
- Long War key to victory is the sustained synchronized application of all elements of national power in their proper proportions
 - *Current effort seems neither balanced nor sustainable*
 - *Over reliance on military...sub-optimized interagency efforts*
- Interagency process is focused on policy development
 - *Little capability to conduct synchronized execution*
- The focus on “democracy” may be misplaced or overstated
 - *Long term objective of democracy may need to be preceded by intermediate objective of stability and support of US objectives*
- Group’s assessment incomplete; however, concerns for...
 - *Success in Iraq and Afghanistan*
 - *Viability of Strategy and Strategic/Operational Design*
 - *Military capabilities and capacities ... are the means sufficient?*

Specified Tasks



- **Determine where we are now and where we are going**
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- ENDS {
 - **Determine desired future regional and global end states**
 - Express in multi-dimensional terms (DIME-FIL)
 - Focus on next ten years
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- WAYS {
 - **Provide integrated strategic options to achieve desired end states**
 - Express in multi-dimensional terms (DIME-FIL) for US
 - Identify potential key coalition/international contributions
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 - DoD / Interagency / Others
- MEANS {
 - **Consider adequacy of means to support strategic options**
 - Identify requirements to execute strategic options
 - DoD / Interagency / Others

Begin with CENTCOM AOR



- **SMEs Scheduled**

- *Counterinsurgency Panel (AUSA Host)*
- *LtGen(Ret) Van Riper*
- *Dr. Tim Ginotti (UVA)*
- *Mr Ken Pollack (Brookings)*
- *COL Vince Nannini (Ex Chief, MNF-I J5 Plans)*

- *Dr. Eliot Cohen (SAIS – Johns Hopkins)*
- *COL(Ret) Derek Harvey (J2/DIA)*

Staff Team Members



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 - **The Long War**
 - **Complex Threat Array**
 - **US Strategic Culture**
 - **Strategic Guidance and Plans**
 - **CENTCOM AOR**
- **Key First Impressions**
- **JCS Deliverables**
 - **Israel – Palestine Background and Prospects**
 - **Threat Assessment – Who’s Taking Advantage?**
 - **Deterring Martyrdom**
 - **Strategic Culture**
- **Way Ahead**



• **SMEs**

- ✓ Gen (Ret) Zinni
- ✓ Mr. Derek Harvey (J2/DIA)
- ✓ Joint Staff J2/DIA, J3, J5
- ✓ Dr. Lani Kass (HAF/CVAK)
- ✓ AUSA Counter-insurgency Panel
- ✓ Mr. Greg Suchan (DASS for Mil Tech Export)
- ✓ LtGen (Ret) Paul Van Riper
- ✓ Dr. Tim Ginotti (UVA, Ass't Prof of Islamic Studies)
- ✓ JCS J2 (Threat Analysis)
- ✓ Dr. Ken Pollack (Brookings)

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
SOCOM CONPLAN 7500



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- *Taliban resurgence supported by AQ threatens progress in Afghanistan*
- *NATO capabilities being tested*

- **Pakistan**

- *GEN Musharraf vulnerable to domestic pressures and resistance*
- *Pakistani succession unclear... stable policy unlikely*
- *FATA disputes erode fragile Afghan-Pakistan relations*
- *Pakistan places security priority on Kashmir and India*

- **Iran assertive, confrontational, exporting instability regionally / globally**

- *Nuclear capability may intensify destabilizing actions*
- *High potential for miscalculation*

- *Hizbollah conflict reinforces use of proxies for strategic effect*

- **Stalled “Road Map” and US-ISR special relationship fuel anti-US sentiments**

Key First Impressions



- **Evolving nature of the Long War and our adversaries**
 - *AQAM, Taliban, Iran, Proxies, Sunni Insurgents, Shi'a Insurgents*
 - *Is the true Center of Gravity "ideology" or "Angry Young Men?"*
 - **Long War key to victory is the sustained synchronized application of all elements of national power in their proper proportions**
 - *Current effort neither balanced nor sustainable*
 - *Over reliance on military...sub-optimized interagency efforts*
 - **Interagency process is nominally focused on policy development**
 - *Little capability to conduct synchronized execution*
 - **The focus on "democracy" may be misplaced or overstated**
 - *Long term objective of democracy may need to be preceded by intermediate objective of stability and support of US objectives*
 - **Group's assessment incomplete; however, we are concerned...**
 - *Long War strategy widely viewed as incomprehensible*
 - *For strategic success in Iraq and Afghanistan*
- (b)(1),(b)(5)
- *Perceptions of exhaustion, overstretch, and distraction have strategic impact*

JCS Deliverables



- **Israel – Palestine Background and Prospects**

- **Threat Assessment**
 - **Actively Supporting Terrorists**
 - **Taking advantage of our security posture**

- **Deterring Martyrdom**

- **Strategic Culture**

Israel - Palestine



- Sincere effort toward resolving the confrontation likely to help reduce Arab rage and improve US credibility
- Previous widespread acceptance of a two-state solution
- Recent events have stalled progress
 - *Quartet (US, EU, Russia, UN) has mandated that Hamas recognize Israel, forswear violence, and adhere to existing agreements before aid and negotiations reinstated*
 - *Potential for humanitarian crisis and possibility of third intifada*
- Israeli actions have complicated the situation
 - *Lebanon War has weakened Israeli government*
 - *Emboldened more radical Palestinian factions to emulate Hezbollah*
 - *Could lead to strategic realignment between Hamas and Iran/Syria*
 - *Tolerance of unauthorized settlements in the West Bank*
 - *Security fence seen by Arabs as unilateral effort to draw Israel's final borders*
- US policy viewed as biased in favor of Israel
 - *Quartet policy of blocking aid gives Hamas status for "standing up to the West"*
 - *US aid to Palestinians receives little credit in Arab world*
- US involvement in negotiations viewed as essential to progress

Threat Opportunism



- **Actively Supporting Terrorists**

- Iran

- *Supporting Sunni insurgents in Afghanistan*
- *Providing lethal support to Sh'ia extremists in Iraq*
- *Equipping Hezbollah in Lebanon*

- Syria

- *Supporting Hezbollah/Palestinian rejectionist groups*
- *Safe haven for Iraqi FREs and Ba'athists*

- **Taking advantage of our security posture**

- Iran

- *Believes US strategic position is weak and declining*
- *Sees US as too "bogged down" to effectively oppose nuclear program*
- *Seeking China's support to counter US influence/pressure*

- North Korea

- *Believes US has limited military flexibility*
- *Sees US as having limited ability to focus on matters outside OIF/OEF*

- Venezuela

- *Believes US is losing credibility as a superpower*
- *Believes US lacks focus on western hemisphere*

IRAN
NORTH KOREA
CHINA
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“Deterring” Martyrdom

- Deterrence is possible if we can identify something to hold at risk...
- “Martyrdom” - A noble act perverted by extremist Islam
- Making suicide attackers requires three essential elements:
 - **Motivated people** (*under duress, “true believers” from angry youth via societal conditions*)
 - **Supportive community** *which honors Islamic martyrdom*
 - **Enabling organizations** *supplying finances, intel, training, contacts, etc.,*
- Addressing martyrdom means addressing the essential elements:
 - **Diminish personal / community motivation**
 - *Improve social conditions*
 - *Counter radical Islamic ideology*
 - *Extend moderate Islamic education*
 - *Emphasize that suicide is **NOT** sanctioned by the Koran*
 - **Disrupt/eliminate enabling organizations**
 - *Sustained kinetic and non-kinetic targeting*

Strategic Culture



- ***CRITICAL: Develop and execute synchronized Long War STRATCOM plan, confirmed by actions, to counter perceptions and manage expectations***
- **Reinforce:**
 - *Moral and ethical basis for policy and action*
 - *Common ground between Judeo-Christian and Islamic value sets*
 - *Willingness to lead, act, or subsidize promising initiatives*
- **Change:**
 - *Impatient...averse to hardships... commitment diminishes over time*
 - *Arrogant...dismissive of partners and allies*
 - *Reluctant to change or admit mistakes*
 - *Culturally naive... inadvertently reinforce perception of US crusade*
 - *Simplistic...neglect complex interactive nature of problems*
- **Mitigate:**
 - *Over-reliance on military solutions...impact on resources*
 - *Idealistic... lack finesse and discretion*
 - *Short-term political focus and polarization*



- **SMEs Scheduled**

- *Dr. Eliot Cohen (Johns Hopkins/SAIS)*
- *Dr. Williamson Murray (USNA)*
- *COL(Ret) Derek Harvey (J2/DIA)*
- *Dr. Stephen Biddle (Council on Foreign Relations)*
- *Dr. Larry Goodson (US Army War College)*
- *Former Speaker Newt Gingrich*

- **Assistance required**

- *Dr. Henry Kissinger*
- *Former Secretary James Baker*
- *Mr. John Hamre*
- *Former Secretary James Schlessinger*
- *ADM (Ret) Blair*
- *Former Secretary Perry*
- *Former Secretary Schultz*

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- **Complex interactive layered conflicts with global impact**
 - **No single causal factor or holistic solution**
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 - **Constant hybrid / asymmetrical conflict punctuated by “small wars”**
- **“Long War” means long... a generational conflict**
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- **Spillover from intra-Islamic conflict, not “clash of civilizations”**
 - **Islamic communities seeking to define their future in a modern world**
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- State sponsors, unwitting hosts, “sanctuary,” and proxies
- Hybrid / asymmetrical approach to warfare

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“Where we are going”

23 October 2006

This Briefing is Classified

~~SECRET~~ – NOFORN – PREDECISIONAL – CLOSE HOLD

Derived from: Multiple Sources

Declassify on: 23 OCT 2016

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Specified Tasks



- **Determine where we are now and where we are going**
 - What are we trying to do? – *identify current strategy and its end states*
 - Are we going to get there this way? – *assess trends*
 - What's keeping us from success? – *identify impediments*

- ENDS {
 - **Determine desired future regional and global end states**
 - Express in multi-dimensional terms (DIME-FIL)
 - Focus on next ten years
 - Compare to currently articulated end states
- WAYS {
 - **Provide integrated strategic options to achieve desired end states**
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 - Identify potential key coalition/international contributions
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 - DoD / Interagency / Others
- MEANS {
 - **Consider adequacy of means to support strategic options**
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Begin with CENTCOM AOR

Agenda



- **Global and Regional Viewpoints**
 - **Strategic Objectives**
 - **Trends**
 - **Impediments**

- **CENTCOM AOR (End States / Trends / Impediments)**
 - **Iraq**
 - **Iran-Syria**
 - **Afghanistan-Pakistan**



• SMEs

- ✓ Dr. Lani Kass (HAF/CVAK)
- ✓ AUSA Counter-insurgency Panel
- ✓ Mr. Greg Suchan (DASS for Mil Tech Export)
- ✓ LtGen (Ret) Paul Van Riper
- ✓ Dr. Tim Ginotti (UVA, Ass't Prof of Islamic Studies)
- ✓ JCS J2 (Threat Analysis)
- ✓ Dr. Ken Pollack (Brookings)
- ✓ Dr. Eliot Cohen (SAIS/Johns Hopkins)
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Strategic Objectives



- **National Defense Strategic Objectives** (Mar 05)
 - Secure the US from direct attack
 - Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action
 - Strengthen alliances and partnerships
 - Establish favorable security conditions

- **CENTCOM RWOT Objectives** (2006)
 - Enable Partner Nations to Combat Terrorism
 - Attack and Disrupt Terrorist Networks
 - Erode Support for Extremist Ideology
 - Protect US and Partner Vital Interests
 - WMD Controlled
 - Key infrastructure and strategic oil reserves protected
 - LOCs safeguarded; choke points unobstructed
 - States capable of border security
 - Active layered security measures emplaced across the region



Strategic End State and Trends

1 of 2

- **Derived US Global Long War Strategic Endstate:**

A peaceful and stable global environment with flourishing free markets, advancing free and open societies based on the rule of law, sustaining an environment inhospitable to terrorist extremists, that eliminates terrorism as a threat to our way of life

(NSS, NSMP-WOT)

- **Trends:**

- No successful attacks on US soil since 9-11
- Access to existing markets/strategic resources unimpeded; but not assured
- US adjusting global posture for the Long War
- NATO engaged; UNIFIL resourced without US combat forces
- Like-minded partners remain committed to Long War; however...
 - *Danger of “donor fatigue”*
 - *Some unease with US insistence on “democracy”*
 - *Increasing partner frustration with US policies*
- Increasing US desire to pursue regional multilateral approaches
- Diminished US influence; hold on “moral high ground” at risk



- Increasing complexity of adaptive terrorist threat
- Unchecked spread of radical ideology via internet, mosques, and madrassas
- Threat dispersion (Radical Diaspora)
 - *Feeds domestic and international problems*
 - *Enhances enemy agility, concealment, and targeting*
- Increasing extremist optimism; perception that they are winning and West is “losing”
- Increasing adversary efforts to acquire WMD-M
- Arab concern for Shi’a ascendancy
- Increasing cooperation between state and non-state actors
- Growing number of Failed / Failing / Fractured states
- Israeli-Palestinian and Kashmir peace remain elusive; no positive movement
- Adversary opportunism; reduced US strategic flexibility, options, and resources
- Informal coalitions of states forming to oppose US interests
- Growing influence of emerging powers complicates US statecraft
- Rising influence of China in Latin America, Africa, and Middle East

Strategic Impediments



- International consensus difficult to achieve (UNSC, P5, G8...)
- Unwillingness to dialogue directly with adversaries (North Korea, Iran, Syria...)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

- Current commitments, policies, and resources limit US strategic depth and flexibility
 - *Fiscal costs of GWOT growing; looming reset bow wave*
- Ineffective Strategic Communications (Public Affairs, Public Diplomacy)
 - *US policies and strategy not uniformly understood – domestically/internationally*

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- Information Operations strategically ineffective
- Dependence on imported oil affects US freedom of action
- Middle Eastern nations reluctant to seek cooperative security arrangements
- *Applicability of international law to Long War issues lacks sufficient clarity*




- We will help the Iraqi people build a new Iraq with a constitution, representative government that respects civil rights and has security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and keep Iraq from becoming a safe haven for terrorists
- Strategic Objective: Iraq evolves into a free, federal, democratic, pluralistic and unified state representative of all Iraqi citizens

National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (Nov 2005)



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(b)(1),(b)(5)





(b)(1),(b)(5)





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Lack of economic development, business enablers, and essential services perpetuate unemployment, undermine support for government, and erode tolerance for Coalition presence

- Government corruption, lack of property law, doubts about the legal system, and inadequate security dissuade foreign investment, increase business costs, and deter NGO participation
- Inadequacy of oil and electricity sectors continues to depress development and degrades quality of life
- “Brain drain,” flight of capital, and erosion of the middle class increases societal vulnerability to extremism
- Banking system in disarray
- Micro development and investment lacking
- Failure to distribute and regularize government revenue to provisional and district levels frustrates public sector growth and development
- Remnants of socialist directed-economy inhibit economic development

Impediments



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Impediments



(b)(1),(b)(5)



Alternative Futures for Iraq



(b)(1),(b)(5)





Iran – End State & Trends

- **US Strategic End State: Transition Iran to a nation that:**
 - **Abides by nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT); renounces terrorism; transitions to a democratic government; is at peace with its neighbors; is a responsible/integrated member of the international community**

- **Trend: Iran on the Rise**
 - ***Progressing toward a nuclear capability***
 - ***Terrorist sponsor***
 - ***Lack of democracy - hard-line cleric rule dominates government***
 - ***Increasing regional influence***

“...may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran.”

National Security Strategy, March 2006 -



Iran - Impediments

Absent policy change; in ten years...

Iran exerts significant regional influence through wealth, military build up, and exportation of terrorism. Creates regional instability due to nuclear and conventional weapons proliferation.

Impediments:

- No US diplomatic relations with Iran; very limited US economic trade
- US trade partners providing weapons and technology assistance
- Lack of unified international resolve to counter terrorist states
- Shi'a ascendancy in Middle East
- Active interference in Iraqi conflict and support to Sunni Taliban
- Strengthened relationship with Syria, HAMAS, Hezbollah, PIJ, Venezuela
- Not adhering to UN Security Council Resolution 1696
- Iran sees nuclear capability as essential hedge against US and region
- Lack of human rights; little religious tolerance; restricts media access
- Economy not a priority; widespread corruption within economy
- Non-responsive to existing US and international sanctions

Syria – End State & Trends



- **US Strategic End State: Transition Syria to a nation that:**
 - **Renounces terrorism; transitions to a democratic government; is at peace with its neighbors; and s a responsible/integrated member of the international community**

- **Trend: Hub for Iranian export of terror**
 - **Destabilizing the region**
 - **Continuing to enhance WMD capability**
 - **Terrorist Sponsor**
 - **Lack of Democracy**



Syria – Impediments

Absent change in policy, in ten years...

Syria continues to support Iran and to export terrorism within Middle East. Dictator continues to be influenced by economic and political factors that destabilize the region. Remains an impediment to Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Impediments:

- Lack of unified international resolve to counter terrorist states
- Russia providing weapons and technology assistance
- Non-responsive to existing US sanctions
- Limited US diplomatic relations with Syria; no US economic trade as leverage
- Interference in Iraqi conflict and Lebanese internal affairs
- Hub of Iranian influence in Arab world
- Lack of progress in Israeli-Palestinian peace process
- Syria sees WMD capability as essential to hedge against Israel
- Growing alignment with Iran, Hezbollah, HAMAS, PIJ, Iraqi Ba'athists
- Dictatorship prevents democratic transition
- Lack of human rights

Afghanistan



- **US Strategic Endstate: Afghanistan that is:**

Secure, stable state at peace with its neighbors. Democratic government. Environment non-supportive of extremism / terrorism. Economically successful. Committed to the protection of women's rights, human rights, and religious tolerance.

- **Trends:**

- Elected national/provincial governments; effectiveness in question
- Pervasive corruption – even beyond cultural norms
- Judicial system has little capacity
- \$7.3B GDP and rising (\$2.4B in 2002); Drug trade ~30% of economy
- “Warlords” dominate the economy – huge disparity in wealth and income
- 70% illiteracy, but slowly falling
- 6 million in school (2 million female) and rising; education valued by people
- Afghan force structure devised three years ago based on a defeated Taliban
 - ANA at 30K headed toward 50K; ANP at 46K headed toward 62K
- Taliban quantity and tactics changing; numbers increased annually since 2003
 - Attack trends on the rise; suicide attacks quintupled in last year
- Likely increasing Iranian support for the Taliban (enemy of my enemy)

Vast majority of the population is on the fence – we are at a critical juncture today



Afghanistan – Future and Impediments

- **Absent policy change, in 10 years...**

Weak Afghan government has control over major cities, with ungoverned tribal areas to the south and east that could provide a refuge for terrorists. Active Taliban insurgency contests control of the country. Reconstruction/economic development anemic. Drug trade flourishes.

- **Impediments to Achieving Articulated End State:**

- Inefficient government/corrupt ministries
- Dilapidated infrastructure: lack of roads, power, water
- Underfunded development; lack of security inhibits IC/NGO activity
- No viable alternative to poppy cultivation as an economic driver
- Ineffective information campaign; Taliban maintains IO agility
- Insufficient interagency/international support to Afghan government
- Not enough security forces to hold areas cleared by NATO/ANA forces
- Taliban fueled by drug trade; can outbid GOA for fighters
- No ability to interdict the Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan
- Insufficient advisor/mentor effort for partnering with ANA/ANP
- Incomplete national contributions/ROE caveats inhibit NATO operations



- **US Strategic Endstate: A Pakistan that is:**

Secure state at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the Long War. Environment non-supportive of extremism / terrorism. GoP maintains control over its nuclear weapons.

- **Trends:**

- Stability of Musharraf regime tenuous
- Internal stability and conflict with India have priority over support to Long War
- Recent agreement has granted greater control over Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to local tribal leaders
- Positive economic growth
- Madrassas continue to educate a generation of radicals
- Kashmir remains an intractable problem
- FATA and Baluchistan failed or failing regions that provide sanctuary for insurgents and terrorists
- Pakistani Intelligence Service (ISI) elements have an ongoing relationship with the Taliban



Pakistan – Future and Impediments

- **Absent policy change, in 10 years...**

Pakistan is still under military leadership, with growing unrest in the FATA and potential cross-border military clashes with Afghan national forces. Islamist influence on the rise. Tensions with India unabated.

- **Impediments**

- Growing Islamist influence reduces GoP's room for political maneuver
- Afghan-Pakistan verbal sniping sours their relationship
- Large Afghan refugee population fueling unrest in FATA
- Continued stand-off with India over Kashmir
- Nuclear-armed Pakistan and India

Specified Tasks



- **Determine where we are now and where we are going**
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Strategy for the Long War
2006 – 2016:
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- ✓ Dr. Larry Goodson (AWC)
- ✓ Dr. John Hillen (Asst Sec State/Pol Mil)
- ✓ Gen (Ret) Joseph Ralston (Special Envoy/Cohen Group)
- ✓ Mr. Michael Rubin (American Enterprise Institute)
- ✓ Ms. Jendyi Fraser (Asst Sec State/African Affairs)
- ✓ Mr. Michael Vickers (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment)
- ✓ Mr. Steve Coughlin (JS J2)

Agenda



- ***Global and Regional Viewpoints***
 - ***Strategic Objectives***
 - ***Trends***
 - ***Impediments***

- **CENTCOM AOR (End States / Trends / Impediments)**
 - **Iraq**
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Why Iraq Matters?



(b)(1),(b)(5)

Iraq: Current End State



From the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (Nov 2005)

“We will help the Iraqi people build a new Iraq with a constitution, representative government that respects civil rights and has security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and keep Iraq from becoming a safe haven for terrorists.”

Strategic Objective: “Iraq evolves into a free, federal, democratic, pluralistic and unified state representative of all Iraqi citizens”


“A nation that can govern itself, sustain itself, defend itself, and is an ally in the War on Terror.”

POTUS News Conf 25 OCT 06

Iraq: Trends



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Iraq: Trends



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Iraq: Trends




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Iraq: Trends




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Iraq: Trends



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Iraq: Trends



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Iraq: Impediments



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Iraq: Impediments




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Iraq: Alternative Futures



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Way Ahead in the Next Week



03 NOV
Fri

Iraq – *Importance, Trends, Impediments, Futures*

06 NOV
Mon

Iraq “*What can we change right now?*”

- * Strategic / Operational / Tactical levels**
- * Think beyond the military**
- * Provide Pros and Cons**

08 NOV
Wed

Refinement of Change Options



Why Iran Matters

- **Regional instability – intervention in Iraq, Lebanon, Israel**
- **Potential to acquire nuclear weapons capability**
- **Potential proliferation of WMD and means of delivery**
- **State sponsor of terrorism**
- **Aspire to achieve regional hegemony**
- **Ability to impact global energy supply**

“...may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran.”
National Security Strategy, March 2006



Iran – End State & Trends

- **US Strategic End State: Transition Iran to a nation that:**
 - **Abides by Non-nuclear proliferation treaty; renounces terrorism; transitions to a democratic government; is at peace with its neighbors; is a responsible/integrated member of the international community**

- **Trend: *Iran on the Rise* - Not responsible in the international community**
 - ***Progressing toward a nuclear capability (enriched uranium by 2007, weaponization by 2010-14)***
 - ***Growing regional influence***
 - ***Global terrorist sponsor***
 - ***Lack of democracy – theocratic republic (two-tiered system) allows hard-line clerics to dominate government***



Iran - Impediments

Absent policy change; in ten years...

Increasingly significant regional influence thru energy-sector wealth, military build up, support for terrorism (al-Qods), and the use of proxies (Hamas, Hezbollah, and others). WMD and ballistic missile weapons capability contributes to regional instability. Continues to contest existence of Israel and US presence in the Middle East. Continues to infiltrate and influence Iraqi government.

Impediments:

- US trade partners providing weapons and technology assistance
- No US diplomatic relations with Iran; very limited US economic trade
- Lack of unified international resolve to sanction against terrorist states
- Shi'a ascendancy in Middle East
- Non-responsive to existing US and international sanctions
- Active interference in Iraqi conflict and support to Sunni Taliban
- Strengthened relationship with Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Venezuela
- Not adhering to UNSCR 1696 (Nuclear Proliferation)
- Iran sees nuclear capability as essential hedge against US and region
- Lack of human rights; little religious tolerance; restricts media access

Why Syria Matters



- **Cleaving Syria from Iran will reduce Iran's regional influence**
- **Iran's conduit for terrorism into Israel and Lebanon**
- **Stake holder in the Israeli peace process**
- **Stake holder in a stable Lebanon**
- **Strategic location - border w/ Iraq, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan**
- **Possesses WMD-M and seeks CBW qualitative improvements**

Syria – End State & Trends



- **Currently Articulated US Strategic End State:**
 - Transition Syria to a nation that renounces terrorism; transitions to a democratic government; is at peace with its neighbors; and is a responsible/integrated member of the international community

- **Trends:**
 - Increasing alignment with Iran
 - Seeking to control Lebanese internal affairs
 - Destabilizing the region; hub for Iranian export of terror
 - Continuing to enhance WMD capability
 - Interference in Iraq
 - Stagnant economy
 - Diminishing access to potable water
 - End of proven oil reserves in sight



Syria – Impediments

Absent change in policy, in ten years...

Remains an Iranian partner to export terrorism within Middle East. Dictator continues to be influenced by economic and political factors that destabilize the region. Remains an impediment to Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Impediments:

- Limited US diplomatic relations with Syria
- No US economic trade as leverage
- Interference in Iraq and Lebanon
- Lack of progress in Israeli peace process with Palestine and Syria
- Committed gateway for Iranian influence into the Sunni Arab world
- Lack of unified international resolve to oppose state sponsors of terrorism
- Growing alignment with Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ, Iraqi Ba'athists
- Inability to enact UN Security Council sanctions
- Syria sees WMD capability as essential to hedge against Israel
- Dictatorship prevents democratic transition



Afghanistan – Why Does It Matter?

- **Afghanistan is still contested by the Taliban and remains a potential haven for AQ.**
 - *The Taliban continues to attempt to impose its will on Afghanistan.*
 - *Even a partial win for the Taliban – control over portions of the country – will enable them to provide a safe haven for terrorism, control drug production, claim victory over the West, and perpetuate the movement.*
- **NATO's credibility at stake: success facilitates future operations, failure could lead to the alliance's unwillingness to engage militarily.**
- **American influence in the region is at stake; including the "Stans"**
- **Iran perceives U.S. presence in Afghanistan as a strategic threat.**

Afghanistan



- **US Strategic Endstate – Afghanistan that is:**

Secure, stable state at peace with its neighbors. Democratic government.
Environment non-supportive of extremism / terrorism. Economically successful.
Committed to the protection of women’s rights, human rights, and religious tolerance.

- **Trends:**

- Elected national/provincial governments; effectiveness in question
- Pervasive corruption – even beyond cultural norms
- Judicial system has little capacity
- \$7.3B GDP and rising (\$2.4B in 2002); Drug trade ~30% of economy
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Weak Afghan government has control over major cities, with ungoverned areas to the south and east that could provide a terrorist haven. Active Taliban insurgency contests control of the country. Reconstruction/economic development anemic. Drug trade flourishes.

- **Impediments to Achieving Articulated End State:**

- Inefficient government/corrupt ministries
- Dilapidated infrastructure, underfunded development; limited IC/NGO activity
- No viable alternative to poppy cultivation as an economic driver
- Ineffective information campaign; Taliban maintains IO agility
- Insufficient interagency/international support to Afghan government
- Not enough security forces to hold areas cleared by NATO/ANA forces
- No ability to interdict the Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan
- Insufficient advisor/mentor effort for partnering with ANA/ANP
- Incomplete national contributions/ROE caveats inhibit NATO operations

These impediments are surmountable – a properly resourced strategy can succeed, but time is of the essence.



Pakistan – Why Does It Matter?

- Pakistan is a nuclear power and potential proliferator
- Pakistan retains sanctuaries for Al Qaeda and the Taliban, with implications for the war in Afghanistan and trans-national terrorism
- Islamist influence in Pakistan could lead to a regime unsympathetic to U.S. interests – one armed with nuclear weapons
- Pakistan remains one of the greatest potential supporters in the Long War
- Potential for nuclear regional war between Pakistan and India



• **US Strategic Endstate – A Pakistan that is:**

Secure state at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the Long War. Environment non-supportive of extremism / terrorism. GoP maintains control over its nuclear weapons.

• **Trends:**

- Stability of Musharraf regime tenuous
- Internal stability and conflict with India have priority over support to Long War
- Recent agreement has granted greater control over Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to local tribal leaders
- Positive economic growth
- Madrassas continue to educate a generation of radicals
- Kashmir remains an intractable problem
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- **Impediments**

- Growing Islamist influence reduces GoP's room for political maneuver
- Afghan-Pakistan verbal sniping sours their relationship
- Large Afghan refugee population fueling unrest in FATA
- Continued stand-off with India over Kashmir
- Nuclear-armed Pakistan and India

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
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Iraq: Trends



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(b)(1),(b)(5)



Iraq: Trends



(b)(1),(b)(5)



Iraq: Trends



(b)(1),(b)(5)



Iraq: Trends



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Iraq: Impediments



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Iraq: Impediments



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Iraq: Alternative Futures



(b)(1),(b)(5)





Why Iran Matters

- **Regional instability – intervention in Iraq, Lebanon, Israel**
- **Potential to acquire nuclear weapons capability**
- **Potential proliferation of WMD and means of delivery**
- **State sponsor of terrorism**
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 - ***Progressing toward a nuclear capability (enriched uranium by 2007, weaponization by 2010-14)***
 - ***Growing regional influence***
 - ***Global terrorist sponsor***
 - ***Lack of democracy – theocratic republic (two-tiered system) allows hard-line clerics to dominate government***



Iran - Impediments

Absent policy change; in ten years...

Increasingly significant regional influence thru energy-sector wealth, military build up, support for terrorism (al-Qods), and the use of proxies (Hamas, Hezbollah, and others). WMD and ballistic missile weapons capability contributes to regional instability. Continues to contest existence of Israel and US presence in the Middle East. Continues to infiltrate and influence Iraqi government.

Impediments:

- US trade partners providing weapons and technology assistance
- No US diplomatic relations with Iran; very limited US economic trade
- Lack of unified international resolve to sanction against terrorist states
- Shi'a ascendancy in Middle East
- Non-responsive to existing US and international sanctions
- Active interference in Iraqi conflict and support to Sunni Taliban
- Strengthened relationship with Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Venezuela
- Not adhering to UNSCR 1696 (Nuclear Proliferation)
- Iran sees nuclear capability as essential hedge against US and region
- Lack of human rights; little religious tolerance; restricts media access

Why Syria Matters



- **Cleaving Syria from Iran will reduce Iran's regional influence**
- **Iran's conduit for terrorism into Israel and Lebanon**
- **Stake holder in the Israeli peace process**
- **Stake holder in a stable Lebanon**
- **Strategic location - border w/ Iraq, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan**
- **Possesses WMD-M and seeks CBW qualitative improvements**

Syria – End State & Trends



- **Currently Articulated US Strategic End State:**
 - Transition Syria to a nation that renounces terrorism; transitions to a democratic government; is at peace with its neighbors; and is a responsible/integrated member of the international community

- **Trends:**
 - Increasing alignment with Iran
 - Seeking to control Lebanese internal affairs
 - Destabilizing the region; hub for Iranian export of terror
 - Continuing to enhance WMD capability
 - Interference in Iraq
 - Stagnant economy
 - Diminishing access to potable water
 - End of proven oil reserves in sight



Syria – Impediments

Absent change in policy, in ten years...

Remains an Iranian partner to export terrorism within Middle East. Dictator continues to be influenced by economic and political factors that destabilize the region. Remains an impediment to Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Impediments:

- *Limited US diplomatic relations with Syria*
- *No US economic trade as leverage*
- *Interference in Iraq and Lebanon*
- *Lack of progress in Israeli peace process with Palestine and Syria*
- *Committed gateway for Iranian influence into the Sunni Arab world*
- *Lack of unified international resolve to oppose state sponsors of terrorism*
- *Growing alignment with Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ, Iraqi Ba'athists*
- *Inability to gain P5+1 sanctions*
- *Syria sees WMD capability as essential to hedge against Israel*
- *Dictatorship prevents democratic transition*



Afghanistan – Why Does It Matter?

- **Afghanistan is still contested by the Taliban and remains a potential haven for AQ.**
 - **The Taliban continues to attempt to impose its will on Afghanistan.**
 - **Even a partial win for the Taliban – control over portions of the country – will enable them to provide a safe haven for terrorism, control drug production, claim victory over the West, and perpetuate the movement.**
- **NATO’s credibility at stake: success facilitates future operations, failure could lead to the alliance’s unwillingness to engage militarily.**
- **American influence in the region is at stake; including the “Stans”**
- **Iran perceives U.S. presence in Afghanistan as a strategic threat.**

Afghanistan



•US Strategic Endstate – Afghanistan that is:

Secure, stable state at peace with its neighbors. Democratic government.
Environment non-supportive of extremism / terrorism. Economically successful.
Committed to the protection of women’s rights, human rights, and religious tolerance.

• Trends:

- Elected national/provincial governments; effectiveness in question
- Pervasive corruption – even beyond cultural norms
- Judicial system has little capacity
- \$7.3B GDP and rising (\$2.4B in 2002); Drug trade ~30% of economy
- “Warlords” dominate the economy – huge disparity in wealth and income
- 70% illiteracy, but slowly falling
- 6 million in school (2 million female) and rising; education valued by people
- Afghan force structure devised three years ago based on a defeated Taliban
- Taliban quantity and tactics changing; numbers increased annually since 2003
- Likely increasing Iranian support for the Taliban (enemy of my enemy)

Vast majority of the population is on the fence – we are at a critical juncture today



Afghanistan – Future and Impediments

- **Absent policy change, in 10 years...**

Weak Afghan government has control over major cities, with ungoverned areas to the south and east that could provide a terrorist haven. Active Taliban insurgency contests control of the country. Reconstruction/economic development anemic. Drug trade flourishes.

- **Impediments to Achieving Articulated End State:**

- Inefficient government/corrupt ministries
- Dilapidated infrastructure, underfunded development; limited IC/NGO activity
- No viable alternative to poppy cultivation as an economic driver
- Ineffective information campaign; Taliban maintains IO agility
- Insufficient interagency/international support to Afghan government
- Not enough security forces to hold areas cleared by NATO/ANA forces
- No ability to interdict the Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan
- Insufficient advisor/mentor effort for partnering with ANA/ANP
- Incomplete national contributions/ROE caveats inhibit NATO operations

These impediments are surmountable – a properly resourced strategy can succeed, but time is of the essence.



Pakistan – Why Does It Matter?

- Pakistan is a nuclear power and potential proliferator
- Pakistan retains sanctuaries for Al Qaeda and the Taliban, with implications for the war in Afghanistan and trans-national terrorism
- Islamist influence in Pakistan could lead to a regime unsympathetic to U.S. interests – one armed with nuclear weapons
- Pakistan remains one of the greatest potential supporters in the Long War
- Potential for nuclear regional war between Pakistan and India



• **US Strategic Endstate – A Pakistan that is:**

Secure state at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the Long War. Environment non-supportive of extremism / terrorism. GoP maintains control over its nuclear weapons.

• **Trends:**

- Stability of Musharraf regime tenuous
- Internal stability and conflict with India have priority over support to Long War
- Recent agreement has granted greater control over Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to local tribal leaders
- Positive economic growth
- Madrassas continue to educate a generation of radicals
- Kashmir remains an intractable problem
- FATA and Baluchistan failed or failing regions that provide sanctuary for insurgents and terrorists
- Pakistani Intelligence Service (ISI) elements have an ongoing relationship with the Taliban



Pakistan – Future and Impediments

- **Absent policy change, in 10 years...**

Pakistan is still under military leadership, with growing unrest in the FATA and potential cross-border military clashes with Afghan national forces. Islamist influence on the rise. Tensions with India unabated.

- **Impediments**

- Growing Islamist influence reduces GoP's room for political maneuver
- Afghan-Pakistan verbal sniping sours their relationship
- Large Afghan refugee population fueling unrest in FATA
- Continued stand-off with India over Kashmir
- Nuclear-armed Pakistan and India

Specified Tasks



- **Determine where we are now and where we are going**
 - What are we trying to do? – *identify current strategy and its end states*
 - Are we going to get there this way? – *assess trends*
 - What's keeping us from success? – *identify impediments*

- ENDS {
 - **Determine desired future regional and global end states**
 - Express in multi-dimensional terms (DIME-FIL)
 - Focus on next ten years
 - Compare to currently articulated end states
- WAYS {
 - **Provide integrated strategic options to achieve desired end states**
 - Express in multi-dimensional terms (DIME-FIL) for US
 - Identify potential key coalition/international contributions
 - Identify obstacles to executing strategic options
 - DoD / Interagency / Others
- MEANS {
 - **Consider adequacy of means to support strategic options**
 - Identify requirements to execute strategic options
 - DoD / Interagency / Others

Begin with CENTCOM AOR

~~SECRET-PREDECISIONAL-CLOSE HOLD~~

JCS Tank Discussion, Strategy for the Long War, 6 Oct 06

Tasks

- Remove 'balanced' from the strategic equation dealing with 'ends,' 'ways,' and 'means.' Balanced implies constrained and compromised thinking and the goal of the group is unconstrained thinking.
- How will other countries take advantage of the U.S.' involvement in Iraq?
- Is Israel-Palestinian progress fundamental to Iraq? Why do we believe the issue is the key factor to MidEast peace? What DIMEFIL recommendations are needed?
- How do we deter an ideology? How do we deter an individual/nation/religion that believes in martyrdom? What tools work?
- In regards to the slide, "Strategic Culture," to the extent that the assumptions are accurate, what do we do to fix them? What do we change, not change, reinforce or exploit?
- Summarize the JCS Tank discussions.
- Summarize discussions from the guest speakers.
- Submit recommended readings for the JCS.

JCS Discussion

The current national strategy documents reflect a national interest in spreading democracy as a means to further U.S. objectives. Instead of spreading democracy, a U.S. objective could be increasing 'stability.' The national security strategy of democracy has negative connotations such as the "crusades" and "unconditional surrender." Does the use of democracy, escalate ideological tension? Does it tempt a clash of civilizations? Additionally, it creates more problems than it solves for Soldiers/Marines on the ground who are implementing the strategy.

How do we deter an ideology? How do we deter an individual/nation/religion that believes in martyrdom? What tools work? In the Cold War, deterrence worked. We've been taking some actions to deter. If this (Long) war is about information, then instead of having a strategic communication annex to an OPLAN, then we should have a strategic communication plan and an OPLAN as the annex. If Information Operations is the main attack, then forces could be PSYOPS, civil affairs, NGOs, and not MEUs

Is there a risk of the U.S. focusing on terrorism at the expense of other (military competitor) concerns? How will other countries take advantage of the U.S.' involvement in Iraq? Are there marriages of convenience between states and non state actors? Who are the other countries or groups that are part of the terror problem?

Have we reached strategic overreach? Are we doing everything (multiple contingencies)? Is there a correlation of the level of effort and the benefits to the U.S.? Is the price of Iraq, damage to the (U.S.) moral high ground and resources? There has been a lack of focus. We're not overstretched, due to the capacity of the Air Force, Navy and Reserves. We have not really understood the nature of the conflict (GWOT/Iraq) that we're in and the right tools to use. What does the problem require the U.S. to do?

In regards to the slide, "Strategic Culture," to the extent that the assumptions are accurate, what do we do to fix them? What do we change, not change, reinforce or exploit? Where do the U.S. and Muslims see commonalities?

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